

Series II
Subjects Files,
1916-1973

Box 12, Folder 1

Naval War College
Correspondence and
memoranda,
March 1943-
December 1947

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COPY

COMMANDER NAVAL ACTIVITIES JAPAN

P.S. Here is a thought which I had when at the College. It has bothered me ever since. I don't know whether you still score gunfire at tactical games, or bomb hits, or whether that is too old fashioned. But when I was there they did, and the umpires always worked up the score on the assumption (unstated and frequently not realized) that the gunfire efficiency of the two sides was the same. That obviously is impossible; no two fleets are of equal efficiency, or even two ships of the same navy. So we studied always a problem that doesn't exist.

I proposed that an efficiency factor be introduced, or rather more accurately, that they stop always using unity as the relative efficiency ratio. Unconsciously the College was using a relative efficiency of unity, by scoring both sides from the same tables. But they didn't realize this, and insisted that they couldn't tell whether Blue or Orange was more efficient and hence could not use an efficiency ratio. Actually as stated they had to make an assumption of relative efficiency, and were making the assumption that efficiency was the same on each ship every game. (hence for careless thinkers unimportant).

As a result the College course tended to make cowards of us, and the numerically inferior force would not accept battle. Now I claim that is bad in more ways than one. First. History shows clearly that ship efficiency does count and that the effectiveness of gunfire of one side may be nine times that of the other (Trafalgar). Second. The proper tactics for efficient forces against inefficient are different from those between equally efficient forces. It is the former we want to learn as the latter condition never exists in life. Third. Many students have left the College with a disregard for interior ship efficiency and the belief that only command counts. Could they see what an efficient fleet could do against an inefficient, their attitude would be different to the improvement of unit efficiency of the fleet.

There might be some sense to the College system of scoring if the ships of a type were considered the same. In that case we would explore the relative advantages of tactical combinations and maneuvers without regard to material or personnel peculiarities of the ships. But when every material difference is evaluated, and the personnel efficiency ignored, it doesn't make sense. A relative efficiency factor of 2 to 1, or 6 to 1 should be introduced by dividing the fire effect of the inefficient fleet by 2 (or 3 or 6), or, if you prefer, multiplying the fire effect as computed for the efficient ship by similar numbers.

Well, I couldn't sell this idea when on the Staff and in a position to argue it. So I suppose it won't sell now. But I still think it is right and had to get it off my chest.

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Slide 0

EXTRACT FROM AN ADDRESS BY REAR ADMIRAL WILLIAM S. SIMS
PRESIDENT, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, 1920

"It lies with you to determine whether, when you become old, you will have to regret the wasted years of your youth; whether at that period of life you will find yourselves simply 'practical men' - 'beefeaters' - or really educated military naval officers. It will depend largely upon self-instruction and self-discipline."

57-70a

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

March 30, 1943

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

From: Captain R. W. Bates, U.S.N.
To: The Secretary
Operational Proposals Board

Via: The President, Naval War College.

Subject: Anti-Submarine Warfare.

References: (a) The Influence of Sea Power on the French Revolution
and Empire - Mahan.
(b) Command of the Sea - Herbert Rosinski in Brassey's
Naval Annual 1940.

Enclosure: (A) Chart of Submarine Positions and Air Coverage
North Atlantic, February 27, 1943.

1. It appears that the great retarding feature to offensive action by the United Nations is the lack of suitable ocean transport in sufficient number and cargo capacity to supply not only the Nations associated with the United States but, and equally important, to supply the armies of the United States on foreign soil. What causes this lack of ocean transport? The answers, of course, are self-evident. These are primarily -

- (a) Destruction of allied merchant ships through submarine action.
- (b) Inability to build merchant ships at a rate fast enough to compensate for sinkings and to attain at the same time a sizeable reserve of shipping for military purposes.
- (c) Necessity to go into convoy system which decreases flow of war materials and food stuffs owing to loss of time inherent in the convoy system.

2. It will be noted from a study of reference (a) that the conditions on the Atlantic today are little different from those which existed in the days of "The Warfare against Commerce during the French Revolution and Empire from 1793-1812". Here we find that -

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The British warfare against French commerce had become so successful that in 1799 the French Directory admitted that "not a single merchant ship is on the sea carrying the French flag". This was in part because "the Directory first, and Napoleon afterwards abandoned all attempts to contest the control of the sea and threw themselves, as Louis XIV had done before them, wholly on a cruising war against commerce". (Reference (a)). Isn't this in effect what has happened today? Here we have, in the Atlantic, scarcely a merchant ship carrying the flag of the Axis powers. This is because Germany was not allowed to build a fleet after the last war which might in any way contest command and because the small Italian Navy is inadequate because of morale, design, and numbers. Germany, therefore, apparently decided with the French of long ago, that the hope of gaining command of the sea for herself was forlorn and therefore she developed a new strategy which rejected "command of the sea" as out-of-date. As Rosinski says, "the whole strategy will be directed upon the objective of immobilizing, or better still, destroying the merchant shipping under the enemy's flag with utmost consideration for one's own armed forces; operations are no longer going to be directed upon the enemy armed forces but upon his economic resources". (Reference (b)).

Thus we see history repeating itself as it has so often done during the course of the known world.

3. How then did France of 1799 combat Britain on the sea - and how is Germany combatting Britain today?

(1) The answer of France was to attack British trade by men-of-war and by privateers, especially the latter. This type of warfare, known as "guerre de course", was quite successful in that the number of British merchant ships of all categories captured or sunk during the years 1793 to 1800 was 4,344. Of these, 705 were recaptured leaving a total loss to the British of 3,639 ships or an average yearly loss of 450 ships. This loss, while large, actually amounted to about two and one half percent of the commerce of the British Empire.

(2) The answer of Germany today is to attack United Nations' trade especially in pelagic areas by submarines - the modern counterpart of the privateer. How successful this warfare on trade has been is plainly shown in confidential reports, which indicate that during the year 1942, for example, the United Nations lost 1,574 ships, most of which were sunk by submarine action. This rate is almost four times the average yearly rate of the British during the years 1793 to 1800. During the months of April, May, June and July, 1942, the average number of merchant ships at sea was 604, of which 346 were in convoy and 258 operated independently of convoy.

Reports indicate that all mass attacks on convoys occurred outside the circles of 300 miles from aircraft bases. Reports also indicate that the Axis submarines now patrol outside area of air coverage. (See Enclosure (A)).

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The above reports are corollaries to the fact that most sinkings today occur outside the area of air coverage.

4. What military measures were taken by the British in the period 1793-1812 to combat the privateer menace and what measures are being taken today? Also what additional measures are indicated by the above study?

(a) The measures taken by the British were (Reference (a), pages 203-208) twofold.

(1) The convoy system which had the drawbacks that (a) much time was lost collecting convoys, (b) much time was lost for the faster ships in the convoy because the common rate of sailing was far below the powers of many of the ships in the convoy and (c) the simultaneous arrival of great quantities of the same goods tended to lower prices. This resulted in many merchants refusing to take convoys, and to protect these as well as ships which parted from the convoy for one reason or another, the British established their second measure.

(2) The patrol system. Here cruisers were disseminated over the ocean upon the tracks which commerce follows and to which the hostile cruisers (French) were therefore constrained. Most of these cruisers were found in the terminal areas of trade and along coastal waters. Wherever located they acted offensively against enemy forces within their areas.

(3) The blockade system. There was an additional measure, not mentioned by Mahan as such, which the British followed which was quite successful. This was the observation of the proceedings in the enemy's naval ports, notably Brest. This was to prevent French warships from getting to sea and forming a combination of ships which might attack British sea power adversely.

(b) The measures taken by the United Nations today seem to follow the above quite closely with the exception of measure 4 (a)(2), which does not seem to be in use in the pelagic areas. Let us discuss each of these in turn.

(1) The convoy system. This system is in use today and has the same drawbacks as it had during the days of the French Revolution. However, it is the most effective system of protection in use and is in use in both the sea frontier and pelagic areas. In the convoy escorts are found both land-based and carrier-based aircraft, battleships, cruisers and anti-submarine surface units, such as destroyers, corvettes, sloops, and smaller craft. This action is of an essentially defensive nature.

(2) The patrol system. So far as investigation has disclosed, there is very little patrolling being done today by the United Nations Forces except in the terminal areas and along the sea frontiers, where patrolling by aircraft (land-based) and by small surface vessels and submarines is an additional accepted and evidently very effective method of protection. This action is of an essentially defensive nature.

(3) The blockade system. Although no blockade such as was practised in 1800 can be made effective today, the same result is being achieved by attacking submarine bases and surface ship bases from the air, and by raiding the bases from the sea in a manner similar to that done at St. Nazaire by the Commandos. This action is of an essentially offensive nature.

5. Thus we see that of the three measures found effective and necessary by the British in 1800, two are in full use today, and are increasing in effectiveness as aircraft, aircraft carriers and anti-submarine vessels are completed and made available. The third method - patrol - apparently is not in full use and is not very effective except, possibly, in the sea frontier areas. This seems to be because of a lack of patrols in strength in pelagic areas. Whether this lack is due to a shortage of sufficient anti-submarine weapons or whether it is due to a rejection of the patrol method or whether it is due to the fact that the method has been overlooked, is not known.

6. The increase in submarine sinkings noted this month (March) would indicate that the above measures are not enough to combat the submarine menace. Increased production of merchant ships and war materials is evidently not enough. It would appear as if the measures now taken in the terminal areas (sea frontiers) are adequate and that the measure of escorting convoys is today reasonably effective and is becoming more so. However, it would also appear, just as it did to the British in 1800, that these measures are not enough - that offensive patrolling in the pelagic areas is also necessary. It is here that the opportunity for marked improvement in protection appears to present itself.

7. Let us see what is suggested. It is this:

(a) Strategical - "To augment convoy protection by sending out 'patrolling and covering' groups each composed of perhaps two converted aircraft carriers and one squadron of anti-submarine vessels (destroyers, corvettes, sloops, etc.), to operate in the convoy lanes where there is little or no land-based aircraft coverage, for the purpose of clearing those lanes of submarines and, on occasions, of surface craft and aircraft."

(b) Tactical - The tactical use of such "patrolling" and "covering groups" would be about as follows -

(1) Submarines to be effective must have -

(a) Time in which to recharge batteries.

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(b) Time in which to get into a favorable relative position with relation to the target.

(1) (a) Therefore, it is planned by this use of these groups to deny to the submarines the time to accomplish (a) or (b) or both satisfactorily. This will require that the aircraft on the carriers be operated day and night, with aircraft radar, for the purpose of hunting the submarines and forcing them to keep submerged or be sunk. This, if successful, should prevent the submarines from being able to operate advantageously and should thus lower their efficiency to a marked degree.

(b) The anti-submarine vessels are to be used as escorts for the aircraft carriers for anti-submarine defense primarily, and for use as plane guards. They are also to be used and, on occasions, this may become their paramount duty, to assist the aircraft in keeping submarines down or in destroying them. Such use in coordination with aircraft has been found highly effective against submarines. In addition they might operate independently on anti-submarine scouting missions. In bad flying weather, this might be the only means of locating enemy submarines.


6. This system of offensive patrols or "killer groups" would probably have a most favorable moral effect on the United Nations and a most unfavorable moral effect on the Axis as it would be a decisively offensive action against the submarines, whereas in the past most of the action taken has been of a defensive nature.

R. W. Bates

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SUBMARINE POSITIONS
and
AIR COVERAGE
in the
North Atlantic
February 27, 1943


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SUBMARINE POSITIONS
and
AIR COVERAGE
in the
North Atlantic
February 27, 1943

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CONFIDENTIAL

Serial 1746

First Endorsement on
Captain R.W. Bates, U.S.N.
Confidential Letter of
March 30, 1943

April 2, 1943.

From: The President, Naval War College.
To: The Secretary
Operational Proposals Board.

Subject: Anti-Submarine Warfare.

1. Forwarded.

W. S. Fye

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101-1110
The following is a copy of a letter (post card) received by
Captain R.W. Bates, U.S.N. at the Naval War College, April 12, 1943 -

Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet

From: Chairman, Operational Proposals Board.
To: Captain R. W. Bates, U.S.N.
Subject: Correspondence, acknowledgement of.

1. Receipt is acknowledged of your letter dated
2. Your suggestions will be given full consideration by the Operational Proposals Board. It is regretted that your ideas cannot be discussed in detail because of the present volume of correspondence and current efforts to reduce paper work.
3. The Board is pleased to receive your proposal.

/s/ W. M. Delany,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy.

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, R. I.

Nov. 20 1947

Memorandum for Capt. Bates

Very interesting. Apparently the Navy Department adopted your suggestion — and with startling success.

The age-old dream of the weaker maritime power of meeting blockade with counter-blockade (*Guerre de Course*) has received enormous impetus from the development of the submarine. The airplane too is a most promising weapon.

We must therefore realize that this is a never ending struggle and we must prepare in peace for its inevitable appearance in war. Otherwise another day may succeed where Germany twice (and France more than once) failed and the issue at sea will go to the nation, not with the strongest navy but to the one least vulnerable to blockade. The implications of counter-blockade are

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enormous. The way to win a war is
to carry it to the enemy. If sea power
is denied this then sea power is
defeated, sea warfare becomes chaos
and the sea itself becomes a woman's
land.

OMK.

0756

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, R. I.

21 March

1951

Memorandum for Comms. Bates

1. In my view, the Patrol System was not used to any extent during the early part of the war because a fundamental technical development had intervened to make it ineffective -- radar and RCM. The privateer was now able to remain in the shipping lanes and still not be detected by the cruiser. Our patrols were generally useless because the U-boat was able to detect the

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Memorandum for

Approach of the patrol craft
and thus avoid damage.

2. Patrol tactics became effective when this difficulty was overcome. And it was overcome by a second technical development — S-band radar. As you well know, this was simply another instance of the traditional contest between weapon and counter-weapon. When S-band radar gave patrol craft the

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, R. I.

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Memorandum for

ability again to take U-boats under observation, the patrol system was restored to its former position of strategic usefulness.

3. I think your letter was probably well ahead of its time. It is a penetrating view of a basic strategic problem we were confronted with at the time.

Very respectfully.

George D. Syzon, Cdr, USCG.

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT R I

Memorandum for

32 f. l. y
Capt. Bates

1947

This is a most
interesting paper. Thank
you for letting me
read it.

Henry Salomon

0760

...fore

Thank you for letting me see this. It is not
only of marked interest in its own right, it is
a fine practical illustration of the utility of
a little knowledge. Which this was more
generally recognized throughout the service

very very
truly

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(SC)QW20

Serial: 0331P34

COPY

24 May 1944

CONFIDENTIAL

from: Chief of Naval Operations.
To : President, Naval War College.

Subject: Evaluation and Study of the Battles of World War II
in which the Naval Service Participated.

Reference: (a) CominCh conf. memo. ser. 03072 of 4 Sept. 1944

1. During the course of the war and shortly thereafter bulletins of "Battle Experience" were issued for the general information of commissioned officers. These studies promulgated the most reliable current information available at the time concerning actual war experience.

2. When these "Battle Experience" bulletins were issued, it was realized that they were not a complete detailed final analysis of all the information.

3. In reference (a), a copy of which was furnished the Naval War College, the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and the Chief of Naval Operations directed that requests be made to the Naval War College for the analysis of action reports. Now that interrogations from enemy sources and enemy documents are available, as well as our own reports, it is desired that the War College evaluate the battles of the war in which the Naval Service participated in the light of all the new information available. The title, method of presentation, and format will be left to the discretion of the President of the War College and these evaluations will be issued under the authority of the War College without further approval of the Chief of Naval Operations.

C.W. NIMITZ

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, R.I.

14 October 1946

Memorandum for Commodore Bates: - Reference trip to Washington.

Monday and Tuesday were completely occupied by the conference held in BuShips in connection with the E.D.S.G.

I had hoped to see Admiral Fitch at the Naval Academy but found that he was out of town on Monday and no assurance that he would be back that day.

Wednesday morning I called on Admiral Fletcher with the idea of possibly clarifying some of the available information on the Coral Sea action. The Admiral was most cooperative but he was hazy on some of the details. The following is in general the gist of the information obtained from this source:

(a) The support group of cruisers under Admiral Grace was detached and directed to proceed to the Westward to intercept the Japanese transports thought to be coming through Jernard Straits. Admiral Fletcher realized that they would be out of effective air cover from his own Task Force 17 but thought that the Army Air Forces from NE Australia or the Port Moresby Area might give some air coverage. He did not remember whether or not the Army had been informed that these cruisers and accompanying destroyers had been detached to operate in the vicinity of Jernard Passage.

(b) I indicated to the Admiral, the general location of CarDiv 5 on the 4th of May and traced their course into the Coral Sea. I then asked him if he would have made the strike on Tulagi the morning of the 4th of May if he had known the location of this enemy force. He said that he thought he would have because his information led him to believe that the Tulagi occupation force present was a juicy target, much larger in proportion than it actually proved to be.

(c) Admiral Fletcher apparently was not aware of the course taken by CarDiv 5 in its approach to and entry into the Coral Sea until I pointed it out to him as indicated in (b) above.

(d) He had no definite knowledge of the search plans employed by the Army Air Forces in Australia and New Guinea. He had been informed that they would support his operations in the Coral Sea and did receive the results of their operations through the medium of daily intelligence reports from ComSoWestPac.

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With reference to the report that enemy aircraft were noted circling about 30-40 miles from our carriers on the night of 7 May, Admiral Fletcher stated that he considered sending in a night attack of destroyers but that there was so much doubt as to the actual location of the enemy carriers that he decided to keep his force together to meet the air attack expected early the next morning.

I asked him what his reactions to the Doolittle raid had been at the time and pointed out the fact that it did not support the strategical plan. He said that at the time he thought it was a good thing for the moral effect that it might have on the public but that the lack of the two carriers involved might have proved disastrous in the Coral Sea Action.

The remainder of the week was spent in accumulating material on the Coral Sea Action and the documents I brought back speak for themselves.

Additional research and translation is now being done in the WDC with particular emphasis on search plans used by Japanese shore and tender based aircraft. The results of these translations should be available the latter part of this week but may prove to be disappointing.

The Army Air Force Historical Section had very little material on the strength and composition of Army air forces in Australia and New Guinea during the Coral Sea Action. They have, however, requested G-2 to supply the order of battle for that area for the period in question and will forward it, if and when it is received. They have also agreed to do some research work with the hope of being able to dig up specific information on air operations conducted by the AAF in support of the Coral Sea Action.

Respectfully,


F. C. DICKEY

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6546-6046
29/Sept/47cl

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NAVY DEPARTMENT
Executive Office of the Secretary,
Office of Public Information
Washington 25, D. C.

In Reply Refer to:
Serial 15222 DPI

12 September 1947

From: The Secretary of the Navy
(Director of Public Information)

To: All Flag Officers
DPIOs all Naval Districts

Subject: Public Speaking Engagements

Enclosure: (A) Suggestions on arrangements
for speaking engagements and
on preparation and delivery
of talks.

(B) Cdr. Roberts' "Public Speaking"

1. With the approach of Navy Day, increased opportunities can be expected to arise for the appearance of Navy speakers before local and national organizations. Such participation by Naval personnel is considered highly desirable both from the standpoint of satisfying natural public interest in the Navy and stimulating greater awareness of the Navy's accomplishments, aims, and needs.

2. In the interest of realizing the maximum yield to the Navy from these opportunities, Enclosures (A) and (B) are forwarded herewith.

E.M. ELLER

Distribution List:
1, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11
and All DPIO Officers

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SUGGESTIONS ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR
SPEAKING ENGAGEMENTS

The Public Information Officer concerned should perform the necessary spade work to accomplish the following:

1. Furnish to the various publicity media well in advance a copy of the speaker's remarks, or, if to be made extemporaneously, a brief outline of the major points to be covered.
2. Assure that similar material is made available to the organization sponsoring the affair. In most cases, that body will have considerable local influence and maintain excellent relations with the press. Their assistance in obtaining favorable attention from the various media should prove invaluable.
3. The speaker should be advised to incorporate local references in his talk, wherever possible. And it should be borne in mind that press and radio will be looking for quotable leads and excerpts having real news value.
4. See that a good photograph of the speaker, together with up-to-date biographical material is made available to both media and sponsor. A good "thumbnail" sketch of the officer's career is preferred to an official biography.
5. Announcement of the speaking engagement should include notice of when the speaker will arrive, if coming from another area; where he will stay and how he may be contacted. The PIO should also announce under whose sponsorship the officer will speak, and name those in charge of local arrangements.
6. Arrangements should be made to have the speaker meet the representatives of the local media on arrival, either at a press conference, a luncheon, or by means of a brief call at newspaper or radio offices.
7. Early arrival, half a day or day in advance of time of speech, is of great benefit in making the speaker feel at home and in supplying local color for the speech. He should meet people and learn something of their affairs. After the speech he should be available for informal discussions.

ENCL. (A)

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HINTS ON SPEECH PREPARATION AND DELIVERY

1. Length - Keep it brief. Maximum should be 15-20 minutes, unless specifically requested to cover technical subject in longer time.
2. Preliminary Work - Find out all possible details on group sponsoring affair, and what their prime interests are.
3. Single Theme - Choose a specific objective and limit speech to accomplish this only instead of touching on several issues.
4. Outline Speech Completely - Go over outline orally, as in extemporaneous talk. Write, dictate or make a record of the speech evolved. Use this as the first draft. When finally polishing, take care not to lose conversational style.
5. Light Touches - Where appropriate, insert anecdotes or personal experiences to illustrate important points. Be certain the illustration is pertinent.
6. Beginning - Start off with something vital, striking or thought provoking. Then go into main point at once.
7. Reiteration Needed - Repeat points frequently; an audience can't turn back pages. Summarize succinctly at the end.
8. Reading A Speech Vs. Speaking Informally - In general, a speech loses its affect if read closely from a paper. This cannot be avoided in certain cases, e.g. radio insistence on adhering to script for purposes of timing and where it is imperative that exact language be used in discussing highest policies or technological details.
9. However, where possible, an informal style should be developed by:
 - (a) Becoming completely familiar with written text.
 - (b) By reading the speech aloud a number of times so that, when actually delivering it, it will be possible for the speaker to glance at a sentence, absorb the idea, look at his audience and speak it.

This has the advantage of adding naturalness to the style and slows up the usually too rapid delivery of a speech that is read verbatim. The pauses, too, will have the effect of creating dramatic emphasis. The ideal situation is to be able to have one's eyes on his audience 90% of the time.

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10. Words - Avoid long words; do not use Navy jargon such as "implement", "cognizant"; use expressive, colorful verbs; use "I" and "W" frequently.
11. Back recruiting drive wherever possible by mentioning advantages of enlistment in Regular Navy or enrollment in Naval Reserve.
12. End with a snap.

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PUBLIC SPEAKING

by

Henry G. Roberts
Associate Professor of Speech
The George Washington University

(A talk on public speaking given at the Public Relations Seminar for Commanding Officers, Washington, D.C., 16 January 1947.)

Gentlemen, there are two things I dislike about public speaking. One is making a speech at nine-thirty in the morning; the other is being forced to listen to a speech at nine-thirty in the morning. But in four years' service as a Public Information Officer I learned, as you have learned, that the Navy is no respecter of personal convenience. There are jobs to be done -- at nine-thirty in the morning or at eleven at night -- and it may be up to you or to me to do that job and to do our level best to see that it is done well.

There is a job to be done. That's why I'm here at nine-thirty this morning. You have a job to do. That's why I'm here to talk about public speaking.

During the past three days you have learned many things about the problem in public relations which confronts our Navy. You are keenly aware of the imperative necessity of leaving no stone unturned in finding ways and means of telling the Navy's story to the American people. You realize, I am sure, that the Navy must now exploit all of its news sources, overlooking none, making the most of each.

Now let us look at speechmaking as a part of the Navy's public relations program. What is its importance? The first part of the answer is obvious. Every time a naval officer talks to an American Legion post or a chapter of the D.A.R. he carries a message -- the story of the Navy. For five, ten, or fifteen minutes he has the undivided attention of his audience, usually an audience made up of people of some importance in the community. If he makes a good speech, if he says something worth saying, he makes an impression upon that audience. What the speaker says will be remembered, talked about, and, in many instances, acted upon. In dealing with relatively small groups, personal presentation of the Navy's case is still the most effective means of gaining community cooperation.

But that is only part of the story. Has it ever occurred to you gentlemen that you are important personages in the eyes of your local news editors? You create news. What you, as Commanding Officers, do on your stations is news. What you,

ENCL. (B)

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as leading citizens in your communities, do off your stations is news. What you say is news. The very fact that you plan to make a speech is news. Every time you accept an invitation to address a Woman's Club or a Chamber of Commerce luncheon you give the newspapers two good news stories -- an advance story telling of your acceptance of the invitation, and a follow-up story reporting the speech itself. Every time you make a speech you kill two birds with one stone -- not only do you carry the Navy's message to the men and women in your audience, but you also reach the wider reading audience by putting the Navy's name and its story in the columns of your community newspapers.

Nor is that all. Speechmaking is of unusual importance in the Navy's post-war public relations program because it creates an opportunity for the public to meet and come to know the professional officers who will run the peacetime Navy. The country knew the wartime Navy; it is very curious about the Navy in the post-war world. When you go into a small town to speak to the local Lions Club, you are the Navy. Your coming is an event. The engineer who shakes your hand has a son in the Navy. He wants to see type of man under whom his son serves. The editor who sits next to you at lunch is sizing you up. If he is impressed, both you and the Navy will get a good play in his paper. The lawyer who introduces you may spend the next week telling his friends what fine fellows we have as naval officers. Every hand you shake means one more friend for the Navy. It's worth doing; it pays greater dividend than any other technique in public relations.

All of this places definite responsibility upon you -- the men who will be making these speeches. Can you measure up to it? I'm sure of it. As Captain Miller has told you, I teach public speaking at The George Washington University here in Washington. A large part of my work there is with senior naval officers -- teaching them to stand on their two feet and to say what they have to say. I am well aware of the problems you gentlemen are going to meet as public speakers. I know your strong points; I know your weaknesses. I know that it is possible for any one of you to learn to do an acceptable job of speechmaking. Learning to speak effectively is not easy, but it can be done. Furthermore -- you can do it!

Now to my short course in public speaking for four-strippers.

Let me begin by pointing out four simple characteristics of every good speech. Remember them! The next time you are called upon to speak in public, make certain that what you say meets these four simple, obvious requirements.

The first characteristic of a good speech -- It must have a message! The speaker must have something to say. What he says must be worth saying; what he says must be worth listen-

ing to. In every speech class I get this question -- "What on earth shall I talk about?" To that question I have one answer -- "Talk about the two things you know best. Talk about the Navy, and talk about your work in the Navy." In your local community and in the surrounding area there is no subject more interesting to Rotary Clubs, Kiwanis Clubs, to posts of the American Legion or Veterans of Foreign Wars than the story of your own Ordnance activity. Your ammunition depot or naval magazine is a focal point of interest for every adult within fifty or a hundred miles. So talk about it. Tell them what goes on there. Tell them of your own work, of your officers, your men, and your civilian employees. Show them how your activity fits into the larger picture of Navy logistics. As you sell your Rotary or Kiwanis or Business and Professional Women's Club on the effectiveness and importance of your own activity you are doing your bit to carry to the American people the story of your Navy. My first suggestion -- be sure your speech has a message. Talk about the thing you know, the thing that will interest your community audience.

The second characteristic of every good speech is Naturalness. The audience wants to hear YOU. Make it your own speech. Don't try to copy Admiral Cluverius, or Admiral Blandy, or Secretary Forrestal. Don't paw through the files for a canned speech sent out by the Office of Public Information. Say what YOU have to say. They want to hear YOU.

The next characteristic of any effective speech is that it must be Sincere. Nothing is more disillusioning than to hear a naval officer talk about the Navy in such way that you wonder whether he actually believes a word he is saying. Nothing so ruins the effect of a good speech as the slightest suggestion of insincerity. And the only way to succeed in giving the impression of sincerity is to be sincere. Believe in what you say; say it as if you believed it.

Finally, a really good speech must radiate Enthusiasm. An enthusiastic speaker is one who shows great eagerness to have his ideas understood, believed, and acted upon. The enthusiastic speaker has a mission. He is convinced of its importance, of its importance to his audience. If you want the taxpayers in your district to be enthusiastic about the Navy, be enthusiastic yourself.

Every good speech has a message. It must have naturalness -- it must reflect the man who is making it. It must have sincerity and enthusiasm. Keep those principles in mind, don't lose your nerve, and you'll get along. Remember those four -- message, naturalness, sincerity, enthusiasm.

Now because you are naval officers and because you have certain failings common to naval officers, I'm going to give you five DOs and five DONTs. They will complete your short course this morning.

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The first of these five DOs is very simple. When you are asked to make a speech, Do it! That is the most difficult decision you will be called upon to make. When the Secretary of the local Chamber of Commerce calls you and says, "Captain, we'd like to have you say a few words at the dedication of our new airport," it's all too easy for you to say, "Oh, no, I can't possibly; I have another engagement," or "I'll be glad to come, but I'm too busy to put a speech together," or some equally obvious lie. You know you should do it, but you just plain don't want to. It's work. Certainly it's work. It takes time. It does take time. You're busy doing other things. But until the Navy has your cooperation in selling its point of view to the public it takes real gall for you to grouse about appropriations and the short-sightedness of the American people. The next time a letter hits your desk saying, "Captain, will you come and speak for ten or fifteen minutes at our next Rotary luncheon," resist that temptation to say no. Call in your yeoman, and before you have a chance to change your mind, dictate a pleasant letter saying, "I shall be happy to be your guest and to speak to you briefly." That's the first DO -- Do it!

The second one is this -- Do it yourself! That means two things. First -- don't palm it off on a junior officer. The junior officer may be a very good speaker. But the Rotary Club wants to hear YOU. They want to hear the top man. The more gold you have on your sleeve, the more desirable you are as a speaker. So don't send a junior officer. Do it yourself.

Even more important -- don't call in the man supposed to be the Public Information specialist on your staff and say, "Write me a speech." Do it yourself. I'm not letting any cats out of bags when I say that there aren't a dozen really capable speech writers in the Navy at the present time. Your chance of having one of those really capable officers is very remote. You can do -- certainly you should be able to do -- a better job of preparing a speech than any man on your complement. Why turn the job over to someone who can't do the job as well as you can? Figure out your own speech. Do it yourself.

The third DO -- Do keep it simple! There is not one of you who could not sit down with me over a cup of coffee and tell me many interesting things about the work you do. With a cocktail in your hand or with an attractive woman as a dinner partner you can think of many things to say. Few of you would find it difficult to stand up here at this conference table this morning and in five minutes tell us about the problems you are meeting in the field. But make a speech -- that's different, you say. Not really! The major difference between conversation and speechmaking is that in a speech one person does all the talking. A good speech need not be an

elaborate oration. Work out a short introduction that will make your audience interested in you and in what you are going to say, choose two or at the most three main points that you would like to have them remember, and then conjure up a brief, punchy conclusion. Don't worry about the words you will use, don't try to dress it up with frills and furbelows. Keep it simple. Practice the speech a few times. Then when you get up in front of your audience think only of the ideas you are trying to put across to them. You will have little difficulty -- even the first time. The people who will listen to you are interested in a simple recital of facts and ideas. Give it to them.

The fourth DO -- Do keep it short! The old story is frequently told of the lecturer in a theological seminary who always warned student preachers that no souls were to be saved after the first fifteen minutes. Very true. The vast majority of the speeches you will be called upon to make should be five, ten, or, at the most, fifteen minutes in length. My suggestion is to make it a rule not to speak more than ten minutes. You may get invitations to talk for an hour. No group of adults, it seems to me, should ever be forced to sit and listen to one man for one hour. Many chairmen will ask you to speak for half an hour, or "take as much time as you like." That, gentlemen, should mean ten minutes. Respect the attention limits of your audience. Keep it short.

The fifth and last DO is far more important than any of the others -- Do what you would do in conversation; look at the man you're talking to. An officer comes into your office and sits down for a conference with you. Then he spends his time looking out the window, looking at the gadgets on your desk, looking at the ceiling, looking at the floor, looking at anything and everything except the man he's talking to -- you. Doesn't it make you uncomfortable? Let an enlisted man come before you for disciplinary action and refuse to look you in the eye. What is your impression of his story? You cannot believe it. The same thing is true of a public speaker. If I came in here this morning and spent my time looking at that clock or that light fixture or kept my eyes glued to a sheaf of papers on this reading desk, you'd begin to squirm, to fiddle with the papers in front of you, to wish to high Heaven that I'd finish up and go about my business. On the other hand, if I look you straight in the eye and can get you to look me in the eye, I can hold your attention. Talk to one person at a time -- look him straight in the eye. It's the easiest and simplest rule I know for increasing your effectiveness as a public speaker. And it works. Notice that I said to talk to one person at a time. That's exactly what you would do in conversation. Take one man in your audience; talk to that one man. Now talk to another -- straight into the eye. Now to another. Easy, isn't it? If you learn that one simple trick, you can jam your hands into your pockets, tie them

behind you, stand on your head if you like, but you'll still hold the attention of your audience. If you want to increase your effectiveness by 100%, do exactly what you would do in conversation -- look at the man you're talking to.

Remember those five DOs: Do It, Do it yourself, Do keep it simple, Do keep it short and, finally, Do what you would do in conversation -- look at the man you're talking to.

So much for the DOs; now for the DON'Ts.

The first DON'T -- Don't apologize! Your audience will not expect you to be professional spellbinder. If they have any illusions on that score, they will learn the dismal truth within the first two minutes. It isn't necessary to advertise the obvious. The wise speaker never apologizes; he takes the long chance that he may be able to fool a part of his audience. Don't apologize!

A second DON'T -- Don't put too much reliance on the supposedly funny story! There seems to be an old tradition in the Navy that a good speech should be a collection of funny stories -- funny, at least, to the speaker. As a result, countless audiences have twisted their faces politely through successions of stale, pointless stories badly told by perspiring naval officers who seem to imagine that every speech must be put together out of Joe Miller's joke book. Obviously, a really good humorous story well told can be useful in putting a point across to an audience or in adding a lighter touch to an otherwise heavy speech. But it should be a sure-fire story; it should have an obvious application to the point of the speech; and it should be well told. That's where most of you fall down. The humorous stories you tell best, gentlemen, usually are stories not to be told in public and to a mixed audience. You've had more practice with that type of literature. Practice does it. If you have a good story, try it out at least eight or ten times in private conversation at the bar or across the bridge table. Then make up your mind about using it in your speech. But don't put too much reliance upon them; a good speech is much more than a collection of funny stories or slightly risque jokes.

My third DON'T is this -- Don't open your speech by announcing your subject! Your opening words are of vital importance. During the first thirty seconds of your speech your audience is passing judgment on you. If what you say is dull, uninteresting, and commonplace, you will lose ground that you may never regain. If your opening sentences are striking, interesting, and attention-compelling, your audience will be on your side, will be eager to hear what you have to say. The easiest way to begin a speech is to get up in front of your audience, to shuffle a sheaf of papers nervously, and then to say, "The subject of my speech tonight is _____." Unfortunately, that is also the easiest way to get on the

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wrong side of your audience. Hearing those words, the audience realizes immediately that you are a bore, that you are without imagination, that nothing you can say is likely to be of interest to them. First impressions are lasting impressions. If the toastmaster or chairman neglects to announce your subject, don't let that upset you. Launch into the introduction you had planned. And don't let that introduction begin with "The subject of my speech tonight is _____."

How can you get your speech started? How can you get the audience interested in what you are going to say? I have one simple suggestion and one easily remembered. Pick up a copy of the Reader's Digest. Choose any five articles; then read the first paragraphs of each of those articles. Did you want to read more? Did you want to finish each article before going on to the next one? The Reader's Digest has become the most widely-read magazine in the world for one primary reason -- it's interesting. Now read those opening paragraphs again. This time notice how they are put together. One begins with a story, another with a novel and striking statement, still another with a new and interesting fact. You can use exactly the same tricks in opening your speech -- a speech the audience will want to listen to. So study the Reader's Digest.

The fourth DON'T -- now I'm putting my head in the lion's mouth -- Don't try the impossible; you can't be effective with a speech manuscript in front of you. In other words, don't read your speech. There are times when for security reasons or danger of misquotation it is imperative that a speech be delivered from a manuscript. Such an occasion is rare. A ten-minute talk to a Rotary Club certainly is not such an occasion.

Getting up to speak with a speech manuscript in front of you and then setting out to read that manuscript is like going in swimming with a millstone around your neck. And it will have the same effect. With your eyes tied down to a reading desk instead of riveted on individuals in the audience you cannot be effective. But you say, "I can't possibly get up to make a speech unless I have it all written out." Fiddlesticks! I hear that same plea from every class of naval officers that comes up the University. Within three or four weeks -- after four or five speeches -- they begin to learn what we've known all the time, that a speech manuscript is a confounded nuisance.

How should you prepare a speech? Do it the easy way! Make an outline of what you want to say. Outline it in detail. Outline by ideas, not words. It's not the words you're trying to put across to your audience; it's the ideas. When you are satisfied with the outline, find an empty room where you won't be interrupted. Stand up; imagine that you are standing in front of an audience. With your outline in front of you start talking your way through your speech. Don't worry about the words you use; they aren't important at this stage of the game.

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Go through it to the bitter end. And when you have gone through it once, don't give up. The second time through is bound to be better than the first. Go through the speech four or five times with your outline in front of you. Then try it without the outline. When you think you're pretty good, try it out on your wife. She'll tell you what's wrong, but don't take her too seriously. It's your speech.

Try the easy way. It will work. You will have a great advantage when you stand up to make that speech. You won't be tied down to a speech manuscript. You will be talking ideas, not words. You will be able to look at your audience -- at individuals -- and talk to them.

The last of the DON'Ts is so obvious it will take only a moment -- Don't forget the man in the back row! He's back there. He's trying to hear you. Make it easy for him.

Now those five DON'Ts. First, Don't apologize. Second, Don't put too much reliance on funny stories! Third, Don't announce your subject! Fourth, Don't attempt the impossible -- you can't be effective with a speech manuscript in front of you! Fifth, Don't forget the man in the back row.

If you will remember and use the suggestions I have given you this morning; if you will remember the four characteristics of a good speech -- that it must have a message, that it must be sincere, that it must be enthusiastic; -- if you remember the DOs -- Do it, Do it yourself, Do keep it simple, Do keep it short, Do what you would do in conversation; -- and if you will remember and avoid the DON'Ts -- Don't apologize, Don't put too much reliance in the supposedly funny story, Don't announce your subject, Don't attempt the impossible, and Don't forget the man on the back row -- you will be able to make, not a great oration, but a sound and effective speech.

In closing, there is one other DON'T, one which transcends all others from the standpoint of public relations. When you accept an invitation to make a speech, don't forget that you are undertaking a public relations mission for your Navy. It is not sufficient for you to arrive at the last moment, get up and say your five minutes' worth, and then dash away at the earliest possible opportunity. When you go to make a speech, you go as the representative of your Navy. It may be that you would have preferred to have lunch at the Club, you may be very tired of shaking hands with members of the Chamber of Commerce, -- but it's your job and you have got to smile while you're doing it. Your assignment is command of your Ordnance activity, but beyond that -- far beyond that -- you have a larger, a 24-hour a day assignment. Each of you must be Public Relations Officer for your Navy. What you do, and what you say, and how you say it may, in the long run, do a very real part in putting across your Navy's message to the people of the United States.

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

31 Oct. 1946

MEMORANDUM for the Staff

Heads of Departments turn in by 0900 Thursday, 7 November, those items needing attention in Washington while Admiral Spruance is there. Informatory matter should also be included.

The items or comments turned in should be on 8 x 10 paper, so that they can be included in the Washington jacket.

ALLAN E. SMITH
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief of Staff

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

7 Nov. 1946

Memorandum for: Chief of Staff.

1. If the President of the College gets time during his visit in Washington he might like to discuss two matters with the proper authorities:

- (1) It often becomes necessary to consult secret despatches in the files of the CNO to clear up matters in evaluation of naval battles. Commander Kamage, while in Washington, was denied access to them. It would be helpful if authority could be obtained for representatives of the Analytical Section to examine these despatches when reference is made to them in action reports, etc.
- (2) The rate of progress of evaluation is directly affected by the duties assigned the Analytical Section and by the number and capabilities of the personnel available to carry out these duties. At present all of the time of the Analytical Section is devoted towards analyzing the major battles of World War II. This time is required to analyze one action and to collect information for the next. The progress is necessarily slow. If it is desired that the Analysis Section perform duties additional to the above more personnel competent in analysis should be provided.

R.W. Bates.

0778

SECRET

11 December 1946

Memorandum for Chief of Staff

War is underway between States X and Y. State Y decides to land amphibious forces on State X for the purpose of seizing a beachhead preliminary to major land operations. The troop convoy is en route. The Escort Commander has orders as follows:

"Neutral Merchant Vessels, and aircraft, which are met at sea may, by their presence, be considered as having established prima facie evidence of aiding the enemy. Such measures will be taken as are necessary to prevent such vessels, and aircraft, from transmitting information. Aircraft may be shot down. Merchant Vessels may be boarded and sent into port for detention as long as may be required to insure that they do not send information. Vessels known to be transmitting information are guilty of unneutral service and may be seized or sunk as exigencies of the service require."

Are such orders legal in international law? What about fishing vessels? What if the merchant vessels refuse to go into port and insist on continuing their voyage?

Comment: The above quotation is from CINCLANTS instructions to CTF 34, Vice Admiral Hewitt for Operation Torch.

R. W. Bates

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

14 December 1946

Memo for President, Naval War College

1. In compliance with your oral directive of yesterday I have the following comment concerning the Bureau of Personnel Plan for the elimination of commodores on the War College Staff:

(a) General Comments

- (1) The prestige of the War College for the present requires such rank. Other military colleges have such rank, especially so as regards Brigadier Generals. Certainly if the Army feels the need for general officers in these colleges, the Navy can feel equally so. Especially now and until 6 months after the war when all special grades will be finally eliminated and all officers in grade will have become permanent.
- (2) The retention of Commodores in key positions, such as the War College, does not cost the government one cent, as the pay of a Commodore and the pay of a Captain are exactly the same.
- (3) Why should a Commodore, not perhaps possessing military brains of sufficient quality to be used as an instructor, at the Naval War College, be permitted to retain his rank whereas a Commodore possessing such brains is penalized by demotion.

(b) Special Comments

- (1) When I took this assignment I was assured that I would retain my rank. I received this assurance not only from the President of the Naval War College but also from the Chief of Naval Personnel himself.
- (2) The fact that I was interested in this work plus the fact that I was to retain my rank, plus the prospect of soon being in a Russian War, guided me when at the Naval Hospital, in convincing the

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Medical staff that I would be able to perform the duties of an active officer. Your letter to me was read with care by the Medical Board.

2. Would it not be preferable to have a flag officer as Chief of the Analysis Board for analyzing the naval battles of World War II? Was this not the basic plan?

R. W. Bates

0781

Memorandum for Captain Grosley

1. Speeches made by me since my arrival at the War College in the fall of 1946 are as follows:

1946

1. Kiwanis Club	Fall River	22 Oct.	30 min.	Seapower
2. St. George's School	Newport	27 Oct.	25 min.	Seapower
3. Memorial Hosp.	Pawtucket	1 Nov.	45 min.	Returning Amputees

1947

1. Quendecim Club	Newport	14 Jan.	30 min.	Surigao Strait
2. Art Association	Newport	15 Feb.	60 min.	Cruise of MINNEAPOLIS
3. Red Cross (Radio)	Fall River	7 Mar.	15 min.	Red Cross Overseas
4. Rotary Club	Pawtucket	21 Jul.	30 min.	Naval Research
5. Rotary Club	Hingham	20 Aug.	45 min.	Russia
6. Rotary Club	Newport	26 Aug.	20 min.	Naval Research
7. Rotary Club	Bristol	27 Aug.	30 min.	Russia
8. Rotary Club	Fall River	25 Sept.	35 min.	Russia
9. American Legion	Bristol	11 Nov.	45 min.	Russia
10. Rotary Club	E.Providence	24 Nov.	20 min.	Why We Need A Navy

Note: Several of the dates given, notably, Item 3, 1946 and Item 10, 1947, may be slightly in error.

R. W. Bates

0782

12 February 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

1. This is a very difficult matter to discuss and not a matter of minutes. It is a long subject and requires very definite knowledge of exactly how Admiral Nimitz, for example, felt in the Pacific as an Area Commander, i.e., Pacific Ocean Areas and as a Fleet Commander, i.e., Pacific Fleet. Certainly, the Fleet Commander under General MacArthur, Admiral Kinkaid, wasn't very happy in his position under General MacArthur because MacArthur was, to all intents and purposes, the Naval Commander and hence seriously questioned naval operations, even those fully in support of his own plans. I have heard pretty strong rumors that Army officers felt in the past it would have been well if Commander Pacific Ocean Areas had been an Army officer. If this is true, then we have the same disagreement with the basic set-up in the POA as we had in SoWesPac.

2. I don't like to see the Commander-in-Chief of a great area or a great Fleet embarked on board a cruising ship. In our study here of the Coral Sea, we can see that Commander Fourth Fleet was better able to make changes in support of his basic plans from Rabaul, where he was based, than was Admiral Fletcher from his ship. The War College Maneuver Board and experience at sea has clearly demonstrated that the Commander of a Fleet should remain with his Operating Staff, as close to the scene of action as is possible, but on shore where he need not maintain radio silence and where he can rest nights and his Staff may rest reasonably well--none of which is obtainable on board a ship in a combat area. The Commander of a Fleet operating such as Admiral Halsey or Admiral Spruance did is a different matter. Admiral Halsey's Fleet was essentially a Raiding Force and Admiral Spruance's Fleet was essentially a great Amphibious Command which operated in a definitely localized area. Meanwhile, back at Guam, in maintaining a fine Operating Staff and a fine radio network was the Commander-in-Chief, who was able to exercise close supervision but not immediate.

3. The conception of the Commander in the front lines is not a new one in naval circles and was redeveloped in this war in Army circles. General MacArthur generally moved forward and took station in the rear of his lines if the area was very large, such as he did in the landing at Lingayen and at Leyte, but except for these operations, General MacArthur remained in Australia after each operation until Hollandia was taken and then, although he based his Operating Staff there, he was generally missing. General Eisenhower told me in the Philippines that he had been following somewhat the Marshal Montgomery

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system of having his Division Commanders as near to the front as possible and visible to the troops on very frequent occasions. He said that Marshal Montgomery ran all operations from near the front lines--I thought he said from his trailer--and that his Chief of Staff handled all operations 48 hours from his rear headquarters. There seems to be a move in this CincLant letter, which may have been derived from General Eisenhower's staff organization, that the Fleet Admiral should be up in the front lines at all times, as Eisenhower indicated was preferable in the European zone. Warfare on land and sea are different, and on land the question of radio silence, for example, while it has certain standing, nevertheless is in no way as important as it is in a big fleet movement where the Commander has no freedom of action to make marked changes if communications alone have silenced him.

4. The idea of the Operating Staff, therefore, I think, is sound and is my idea of what Nimitz's Staff was at Guam. The idea of an Advanced Base Staff is also satisfactory, and that could be the Staff at Pearl. The Rear Echelon Staff would be Commander, Western Sea Frontier who, in the last war, was assigned duties as Deputy Cominch, but who, under this set-up, would be Deputy CincPac. I think that I prefer in this case the Deputy Cominch set-up for a sea frontier of that nature, as his control reaches through the Nation. I think that the Admiral at sea should have to worry only about matters in the sea.

R. W. Bates

0784

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, R. I.

25 Feb. 1947

Memo. for: Commodore Garroli
Captains Bates
Hartung
Dees
Dale
Mr. Blessing (for information)

Comment is requested on the following not later than Thursday, 27 February. A discussion of "History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II" occurred last fall, and the decision was to buy 15 copies and that we would like to have 35 additional copies^{free}. Each set contains 14 volumes and retails at \$5 per book. Volume XI is "Operations in North African Waters".

The question is this:

- (a) Should the Naval War College furnish the students freely with this quite good account of the Navy in World War II?

or

- > (b) Should access to this history be limited and the students be pressed to refer to the originals and make their own analyses?

- (c) How many sets (14 per set) should be purchased?

Your opinion and comments are needed because it is an important aspect in the instructional phase of the Naval War College.


Allen E. Smith.

0785

13 March 1947

Memorandum to: Chief of Staff

This is a very unusual book. While it is in reality a satire, there is considerable truth in the picture portrayed. We, in the Navy, have seen some of this, but how much actually occurred, would only be known in the higher echelons.

Colonel Dunlap has succeeded in giving a short resume of the background of the book with the leading figures.

While I cannot believe that the higher echelons would go to the lengths here shown, the fact that this officer was at Headquarters Army Air Forces (Washington), also overseas in Headquarters on staff 8th Air Force and United States Strategic Air Forces, gives some credence to the thought that some matters similar to these were occurring.

The book makes interesting reading. A long digest of it is in the Readers Digest. While I do not recommend it for study, it can be read as recreation as well as an indication of what not to do in most cases.

R. W. Bates

0786

26 February 1947

Memo. for: Chief of Staff

1. My opinion is that the students should be furnished with a good account of the Navy in World War II because there will be no account having continuity anywhere. Officers should be familiar with the actions in this war.
2. On the other hand, I would be quite insistent that the students write their own reports by reference to the files. The staff should be readily able to determine whether an officer has done the job thoroughly or has copied it verbatim from the HISTORY.

R. W. Bates

0787

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, R. I.

27 March 1947

Memorandum for Mr. Forsyth Wickes:

The following items marked (a), (b), and (c) are extracts from a book by Pertinax. I have checked part of it - the part in Joffre's memoirs, and, although the wording is not the same, the idea is the same. The difference is probably due to variations in translations. Also what Joffre said here is not in one paragraph, as indicated by Pertinax, but is in two or three places. I have a feeling that Pertinax wants to make it look a little worse than better.

There is no question as to the tremendous capabilities of Petain as a tactician. He seems to have been quite wonderful in those days - but there is doubt to his excellence as a strategist.

- Quotations -

- (a) "But it should be noted that the all-important and risky decision - the decision not to withdraw from the right bank of the river, to avoid a recession which would infallibly have led to the loss of the fortress - was taken on the morning of the twenty-fifth of February by General de Castelnau."
- (b) "And it must be added that, in April, General Joffre thought it necessary to remove Petain from the sector, to promote him to the command of the Army Group, because he found him inclined to order that very retreat against which the High Command had set its head two months earlier. He replaced him with Nivelle on May 1. Thus Petain is more a tactician than strategist."

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(c) Marshal Joffre says it flatly in his Memoirs: "At this juncture a new commander of the Army Group had to be appointed. Thus occurred an opportunity to acknowledge his merits by a promotion and to get him away from Verdun, which seemed to me necessary.... During a round of inspection which I made at Petain's headquarters, in July 1916, I was struck by his pessimism, and the impression was shortly afterward confirmed by others. As early as June, Foch's firmness during his visit to headquarters had calmed the excessive fears aroused by Petain, whose confidence in the length of time resistance could continue at Verdun was very limited."

R. W. Bates

5 May 1947

Memorandum for Chief of Staff:

1. I should like to talk to you at your convenience, the matter not being urgent, on the question of my staff and their reliefs.
2. I am losing Captains Dickey and Willingham and Commander Ramage. Who is to replace them, I do not as yet know as I can see the pressure teams making moves to change the original prospective assignments. For example, I had understood that I was to get Captain Ashford. Captain Johnson says, that in view of the necessity for certain qualifications in this type of work, it would be well to assign Captain Montgomery to the Analytical Section, and that they would be pleased to let me have him. I know that requests have already gone in for Captain Smith.
3. I have told my staff here that I did not desire to detach them until all the preliminary work for the Battle of Midway had been worked up. Both Captain Dickey and Willingham feel that they can accomplish this by early June.
4. The leave matters seriously affect my work here. Everyone wants his leave, and in view of the type of work at the College, I think that everyone should have his leave before reporting permanently to me. Assuming that this is concurred in, it becomes essential that those officers who are to be assigned to the Analytical Section be directed to report here now. This will not be too difficult because I have talked to Captain Johnson, and I find that officers who will be ordered to the staff are being placed in positions in Op Problem 8, where they can be relieved without seriously affecting the Problem. The reason for bringing them here early is that it takes time for them to absorb all of the many points which it has taken the Section months to discover and analyze.
5. I feel that, if I can get them within a reasonable time, they will have a deep interest, will have a good picture of their new assignment, will have taken over thoroughly from their predecessors, and will be thinking, in a general way, of their assignment while on leave.

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6. We have not as yet received the most vital Midway translation, i.e. that of the Striking Force, which Force included most of the carriers. Admiral Ofstie has repeatedly promised that he would see that we got it, preferably prior to publication in the O.N.I. Bulletin, but as the O.N.I. Bulletin appears in May, it would seem as if we had been forgotten.

R. W. Bates.

0791

15 May 1947

Memorandum for Chief of Staff

1. I have looked over this letter to Captain Evans and I will comment categorically as follows:

(a) The Spruance interview is in the library, and I have read it with interest and find it understanding and a definite asset to the College. More articles of this kind are invaluable in alerting the public to the high caliber of our Naval Commanders, and, also, to the high position the Naval War College occupies in the defense of our Nation.

(b) There is some discussion about the Spruance interview in Newport, but to what extent, I am not as yet qualified to say. My attention was directed to this article by certain gentlemen at the Reading Room. The remarks were extremely friendly. It is a human, and especially an American, trait to desire to know people in the limelight. I am glad to see that Mr. Robert Young is not seizing all of the headlines in the Rhode Island area. I believe that a remarkably successful Commander of his Nation's forces in war is entitled to at least the same recognition afforded an outstanding industrialist. This article in the Providence Journal merely jelled what most thinking people had already believed about Admiral Spruance.

(c) I thoroughly believe in the necessity for the Navy keeping in the limelight in a generally favorable way, although I am not so sure that unfavorable comment, on occasion, does not have a salutary effect. It shows that the Navy is human.

(d) In connection with the battle records of individual ships, I feel that there is no doubt but that the public is still interested in them, especially in those which have some particular reference to a definite area. For example, a story about a ship named after a city, or after a state would attract readers in both that city and state; also articles about some citizen of some city or state would make good reading material in that city or state. Matters of this kind were published, whenever possible, during the war with excellent results and have been published since the war with equally good effects. I think that this type of material is handled generally by the Public Relations Officer in Washington. It would appear to me preferable, therefore, for the Providence Journal to obtain the information on these matters from Washington, rather than from here. The reason for this

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opinion is that there is considerable material in the Archives which presumably is still classified, in some cases perhaps highly classified. This Command does not know what material is now being released to the Press from the voluminous material available.

(e) There is another reason why I believe it not well to allow a Press man too much freedom around the War College. Although a reporter, for example, might come here for a while for the purpose of obtaining information for articles similar to that indicated above, he is bound to be thrown in contact with the trend of thought in the War College, and is bound, therefore, to form an opinion which might be adverse to our policies or, even if not adverse, might be aired in areas where it would be available to a possible enemy.

(f) I ran a security desk in Washington before the war, between July 1935 and July 1938. I found that I had to be very careful to insure that information of a classified nature was not becoming indirectly available to civilian organizations or to foreign nations. I am not so sure that it would be a good thing for the information in the College on the atom bombs, guided missiles, possible enemy capabilities, etc. to be available to anyone not immediately connected with the military service, even though only indirectly through near contact. I feel that no matter how hard we might try here to keep certain information away from a reporter, and even though the reporter did not seek the information, we would necessarily find that he was in possession of it anyway, whether he wanted it or not.

(g) This is a rather long discussion to say "No". There are, of course, occasions when we might have something for the Press which a reporter like Mr. Spilman might use advantageously, and this we might feed to him. Otherwise, it appears to me that that this feeding should be done in Washington.

R. W. Bates

0793

12 May 1947

Memorandum for Chief of Staff

1. The assignment of officers for the Analytical Section is quite satisfactory as to the officers concerned, but it is one less than was agreed on when the requests were made on Washington. The organization as visualized by me, called for two airmen and two surface ship officers, or a total of four assistants. I personally believe that there is no reason within my own division for changing this recommendation and I still desire the four assistants originally requested.

2. I realize that the decisions will have to be made by the High Command of the College, and therefore it may not be expedient to give me the help I require. On the other hand, I hope that in weighing matters, the Analytical Section will not fall into the same position that the Engineering Department on board ship falls, in the assignment of numbers and quality of personnel. It has been my experience throughout my naval career that the Engineering Divisions always are unfortunate when compared with the Deck Divisions.

R. W. Bates

0794

28 May 1947

Memorandum for Commander Carroll

1. I have read over your proposed organization and desire to comment on it - (a) In general, (b) Specifically.

(a) General Comment -

I think that, in general, it is a good organization and will handle the needs of the College along a sounder line of endeavor than at present obtains. I am not particularly in favor of two items in the general sphere. (1) I see no reason for so many Assistant Chiefs of Staff in such a relatively small organization. As a matter of fact I see no reason for an Assistant Chief of Staff at all. I feel that there has been a tendency in this organization to imagine a Command much larger than it is, and for that reason I view the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, the deputies and the supervisors with concern. It may be that with the vast class of junior officers in the expected future that some sort of supervision may be necessary, but I am reluctant to feel that such a person is required for the senior class.

In considering the question of civilian personnel, and civilian personnel must be considered, I must request that every effort be made to insure that my office does not lose the services of its present civilian staff for assistance in my analytical activities. Provision must be made somewhere for this office to have certain personnel definitely assigned to it, as a very particular type of writing, etc. is required, and I have found few secretaries that fill my requirements. Mrs. Keith and Miss Ferman do admirably in this regard, and I shall be very reluctant if Mrs. Keith, at least, is not assigned to me.

(b) Specific Comment -

The specific comment covers the Department of Analysis alone. I find in this organization, the same difficulties represented which I have repeatedly requested be set aside. I don't know why this is, but there is evidently a misunderstanding somewhere. What I have tried to explain to your Board is that

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this Department is completely unable, excepting on rare occasions, to handle anything other than the battle studies. This type of work is extremely laborious and requires a great deal of time on the part of the individual members of this unit. It may not be known to your Board, but this office works every day until about 5 o'clock, repeatedly on Saturdays and Sundays, to say nothing of work at home, in endeavoring to put out at a reasonable speed, an analysis of a battle. The minds of the personnel who are trying to operate back in 1942 should not be broken out of that vein of thought and into, for example, 1947 or 1950, because the weapons and tactics are considerably different. This Command has received some criticism because of reputed hindsight. This can be attributed, in part, to the fact that it is hard to throw one's mind back into 1942. Any break into 1947 or 1950 naturally delays the solution.

It is, of course, a function of the President of the War College to determine the position that the major battles of World War II are to occupy in this assignment. In this connection I was advised that they had a major priority. Should this Department be called upon to perform the majority of the functions listed under Paragraph 6 of the staff organization, it is to be expected that Naval Battle studies will be submerged.

When I agreed to handle some special matters, I was merely being a "sport", with the hope that I might, on occasions, be helpful in settling or assisting in settling some problem which might be bothering the College. Instead of that, I am now called upon to evaluate the effects of new weapons, to conduct research on special matters, to comment on fleet publications, etc. I feel that there should be a star in front of all of these, as any one of them might be sufficient to stop work on the Battle studies for some time.

2. I don't want to appear uncooperative, but I owe it to the President of the College to state the facts plainly so that they may be understood.

R. W. Bates

0796

27 May 1947

Memorandum to Chief of Staff

1. With reference to my request for orders to Washington I desire to state that my trip to Washington has two objectives, viz: (1) To see Admiral Fitch and (2) To see Captain Chandler. I have made arrangements to fly down at 12:30 tomorrow afternoon and to return on Friday.
2. I spoke to Admiral Fitch on the phone the other day and I discovered that although he had read the Coral Sea, he had not had a chance to do much more, as he said he was in the process of getting re-organized after having been retired about one month ago. He said that he would like to talk to Admiral Fletcher before he wrote anything. I told him that we had already heard from Admiral Fletcher, but whether he could understand or not, I do not know, as the communication was terribly poor. The indication I got from Admiral Fitch was that it might be some time before he got around to really looking at the book. I feel that if I can get down there and talk to Admiral Fitch, and at the same time exchange copies with him, I may be able to expedite his action. Very frankly, it is not necessary to have any approval from Admiral Fitch at all, as he was a subordinate Commander.
3. In addition, while in Washington I would like to see Captain Chandler, to see what can be done about printing this book expeditiously. It seems silly to spend hours and days and months of the most painstaking effort to get something out and then to have months go by with no definite action. I believe that I can if not speed it up, learn the method of approach.
4. I have spoken to Captain Hanson about the printing and he agrees with the above plan. In fact, he suggested it.

R. W. Bates

0797

9 June 1947

Memorandum to Commodore Carroll

1. In pursuance of the discussion this morning concerning the presentation, I want to comment as follows:

(a) General.

I think that the presentation is, as a whole, well done and should be interesting to those who are invited to listen. I have some suggestions, however, which I personally believe would improve the reaction of the listening audience. First, I would like to suggest that too much time is given to the background and to the strategic area. Not that it is not important, because every word of it is important, but because it appears to me that the enemy capabilities and own courses of action are of much more interest to your audience than are the background and strategic areas. You probably noted today that all of the questions were based upon the strategic concepts, and that nothing at all was addressed to the chair concerning the background of the problem and the strategic areas. Therefore, it might be better if both Dunlap and Montgomery were given more time on their phases at the expense of the background and strategic areas. If necessary, you might sum up the whole thing as you were doing. I thought that most of the charts were pretty good, although some of the strategic charts were a little lacking in character.

(b) Specific Comment.

(1) Commodore Carroll.

I think Commodore Carroll did not speak loud enough, as it was hard to hear him where I was. I suggest that he check this upon arrival in his lecture room in Washington. I think that it would be wise if all slides were read by either Commodore Carroll or Captain Crosley, or both. Should Captain Crosley do it, he should rise and read it, perhaps using a pointer. In this connection, it would be well if you brought along our arrow pointer, so that Commodore Carroll will be able to face the audience when discussing the charts, more than he did this morning. The necessity of pointing things out on a chart one's

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self, often interferes with communication between the speaker and the listener.

(2) Captain Crosley.

Captain Crosley, in my mind, spoke too fast, and his back and face were, for a large portion of the time, directed at the chart rather than at the audience. Perhaps if you can cut Captain Crosley's time and reduce his coverage, he may, in addition, be able to slow somewhat. It struck me that the area studies presented by him were a little too long and too general. I suggest here, that although it is well to point out the global nature of a problem of this kind, that it be very general, and that more specific discussion be made where particularly applicable to this problem. I should like also to suggest that where Captain Crosley discusses rivers such as the Amur and the Lena, that he indicate whether they are open to navigation throughout the year. Very frankly, for this problem both these rivers seem unimportant.

(c) Both Captain Montgomery and Colonel Dunlap covered their subject matter very well in the limited time, but it appears to me that their subjects are the ones most vital to this problem and should be so expanded as to cover most of the points brought up in conference today. I still cannot help wondering what actually would happen to our air over the continent. The Germans shot down, roughly, 17,000 planes without employing the VT fuse. I presume that they have such a fuse now. Do you remember what General Anderson said concerning the raiders over Germany and the VT fuse? I thought Colonel Dunlap pronounced combatant and formidable incorrectly.

2. Finally, I still think that it might be well to point out the motives of this problem, not as an apology, but as an indication of exactly what the problem is. As you so aptly said on the platform, it is not a War Plan, but is simply a study of a modern situation which could develop and of the action to be taken to solve its first phases. As I visualize the problem, it is solely to train the students in the solution of a military problem, with definite assumptions, and by solving it, the students become familiar with the solution of large problems--global--and at the same time, become familiar with the strategic area.

R. W. Bates

0799

10 June 1947

Memorandum for Commodore Carroll

1. I have looked over this Air Intelligence Estimate and I think that it is, in general, sound. However, there is one point in it, in particular, which arouses my interest, and that is paragraph 5 on page 3. It has always been my understanding that the "method of capabilities" was essentially the German General Staff method, and that the "method of intentions" was more or less Napoleonic. It is possible that there is a little of both in both. However, the "method of capabilities" as discussed in this paragraph 5, is not correct. What is discussed here, is the "method of intentions." Fortunately, I looked through the estimate form and found that it calls for the listing of enemy capabilities in the order in which they may affect the mission, and not as stated in paragraph 5.

2. I am quite interested, also, in what Admiral Brown calls the Estimate of Enemy Air Reaction. This is not anything new, and is expounded in the Green Book Estimate of enemy capabilities and, by inference, in the Armed Forces Staff Estimate. No course of action can be adequately tested unless it is tested against the enemy capability which opposes it. To do this requires a definite study of enemy reactions. What seems to have been discovered here as a brilliant new mental process is, in fact, an old mental process which was placed in print long ago. In my opinion it is the only method by which an adequate comparison of all courses of action and enemy capabilities can be made.

R. W. Bates

0800

29 July 1947

Memo for Lieut. Blank

1. With reference to your courtesy in withholding my checkage until you heard from me, I wish to state the following:-

"I was detached from the Philippine Sea Frontier, where I was a Commodore and Chief of Staff, and ordered to temporary duty in the 12th Naval District. I had been found to have some slight heart condition which was to be checked in Mare Island Hospital. I was ordered to Mare Island Hospital for temporary duty where I remained until I was declared well. Then I was ordered to the Naval War College. My orders were for temporary duty which continued until January of this year when I was ordered to permanent duty. The reason for the temporary duty was that the Bureau of Personnel was unable to spot me to my new job as a Commodore and, therefore, they ordered me to temporary duty which permitted me to retain my rank. Except for the first few days in the hospital, I was allowed to be up, and finally to go home as I desired. I resided with my parents in Alameda, California when away from the hospital.

The question as to whether, for the period mentioned, I was to be allowed quarters allowance was, I feel quite sure, discussed at the time and was decided in my favor.

I can see no reason why I, under the above peculiar situation, am to be deprived of allowances granted to others? Wasn't there some order issued which stated that officers and men returning from the combat areas were to be awarded certain allowances?

All of this is hazy in my mind, but appears to me to be correct enough to support my contention that I should not be checked the allowances in question. Certainly, had it not been the Bureau's wish to retain me in my present rank, I would have received permanent orders. As the Spaniards would say, "No es la culpa mia."

R. W. Bates
Captain, USN

0801

5 August 1947

Memo for Chief of Staff

1. In accordance with your oral direction I have read the book "The Japanese at Leyte Gulf" by James A. Field, and I have had it read by the senior air member of my staff, Captain Ashford.

2. My opinion of the book follows:

It covers the Battle for Leyte Gulf from the Japanese side only. It fills a gap in the study of this battle, as presented at the War College last year, in that it not only presents the Japanese plans, the reasons for arriving at them, the major events of the battle and the reasons for its failure, but it also appraises the principal Japanese Commanders. Although much of the information provided in the book is in the USSBS interrogations and reports, the method of presenting the information and of tying it together without mention of the American Commanders is interesting and instructive. The book shows a group of the naval and air operations presented, which is unusual in one of the author's limited experience. Perhaps Rear Admiral Ofstie had a hand in that.

3. In view of the above, it is recommended that this book be required reading when the Battle for Leyte Gulf is studied.

R. W. Bates

0802

13 September 1947

MEMORANDUM AS TO BUDGET

The Naval War College is the Navy's sole institution of learning where the art of command in pure naval matters receives primary attention. Its objective is the "improvement of professional judgment in command" and it is charged by the Nation with producing successful commanders in war.

Its importance to the National Defense cannot be over-emphasized. It plays a part similar to that of a "school of football coaches." It trains the coach (CinC) who, in turn, takes competent players (ships) and welds them into a closely knit team (force or fleet) and then directs the play (tactics) thru a signal calling quarterback (commander) who thoroughly understands the game of football (art of war). All Americans know that a good football team with the coach poorly trained in the art of football with the resulting poorly trained quarterback (unless he is a genius) rarely ever wins football games. All students of war know that a good force or fleet with a CinC poorly trained in the art of war and with a force or fleet commander also improperly trained, rarely ever wins battles. When a coach is poor he is generally fired, and a new one is obtained after much search at no matter what cost. In the big universities, the new coach is usually

0803

chosen on his record.

When a Commander-in-Chief, or a Commander, fails he should also be fired. A new one must be obtained at once. Often there is no record as to his ability as a strategist or a tactician, excepting that at his War College. Note here that General Eisenhower stood one at the Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth. The Naval War College does not classify its graduates by class standing, but the President of the College and his staff do obtain good ideas of the capabilities of various students. Many of its graduates in this past war excelled in command. Among these were Admirals King, Nimitz, Halsey, Spruance, Hewitt, Marine Generals Smith and Geiger, Army General Kruger.

As the only place in peace where a Commander's ability in solving military problems can be adequately tested and where his professional judgment can be improved is at the Naval War College, it becomes immediately apparent that the War College must also be kept up at no matter what cost. For, at the War College, not only do Commanders learn to solve military problems, but they also learn to use there the new weapons of war in chart and game board maneuvers. Thus the student, by paper operations, not only improves his professional judgment, but he, at the same time, solves problems, at small cost, which had the fleet been forced to play them, would have cost the government untold millions of dollars, as well as serious diplomatic headaches. This statement is not opposed to fleet maneuvers--it considers them necessary--but merely

indicates how many ideas (theoretical) can be solved at the War College.

It is, of course, apparent that a football coach who is not given the facilities for teaching the game, cannot be expected to do his best. The same applies to the War College. If it is not given sufficient facilities (money) to insure its best use, it cannot be expected to produce its best product, and if the President and Chief of Staff who properly should be studying the students and the curriculum to determine who and what is best, are forced to worry about finances, how can they be expected to produce the best results in their students? A few thousands of dollars spent wisely at the War College may save the Nation in War and may, by assisting in ending war quickly, save the Nation billions of dollars.

The War College has recently been reorganized to the end that the maximum use of all facilities with minimum officer and civilian personnel can be made. This reorganization includes two new departments--one of Logistics and one of Analysis. Both of these departments support the department of Strategy and Tactics and both of them were directed to be established by the Chief of Naval Operations. A discussion of the Logistics department has been made and is forwarded herewith. The department of Strategy and Tactics speaks for itself. Therefore, the department of Analysis will be discussed now.

0805

14 October 1947

Memorandum for Chief of Staff

1. The situation affecting my section is becoming somewhat confused. I suggest that I be authorized to make a trip to Washington to investigate for myself. I am willing to stand all expense. Let me indicate 3 happenings:

- (1) No more translations. We have requested enough translations and the CIG has agreed to translate enough to keep the section busy until June, anyway. However, it now refuses clarifying translations which we request from time to time. I know Roscoe Hillenkoetter very well and I can discuss the picture with him.
- (2) They appear to have lost the original manuscript on the Battle of the Coral Sea, together with the forwarding letter which directed the printing with Bupers' funds. Captain Chandler states that it seems to have vanished. The search is continuing.
- (3) My staff should not be decimated. The work is too slow and arduous and requires too much research to permit an officer to be summarily detached. All officers agree that it takes at least 2 months to get oriented into what is required. I should like to discuss this point with Bupers.

R. W. Bates

0806

6 October 1947

Memorandum for Chief of Staff

Subject: Level of Study at Naval War College.

1. In view of the fact that not all in Washington seem agreed on the level of study to be undertaken at the Naval War College, the following remarks of General Fairchild, Commanding General at the Air University, may be of interest:

"We definitely do not agree with General Gerson's view that there is no requirement for War College level instruction within each of the three services. We feel strongly that the commander of each force is responsible for the highest development of the strategy of the employment of that arm. Just as the Naval War College for many years has considered the higher strategy of naval employment, we feel the Air War College must continue the study and development of the strategy of employment of air power and all its related aspects. Quite apart even from that consideration, it is perfectly obvious that the physical capacity of the National War College must always remain too limited to serve the needs of higher education for the services. The quota is but thirty officers a year."

Respectfully,

C. R. HENSE
Rear Admiral, USN

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Admiral Brown
Capt Dees
Capt Hasting
Capt Seales
+ return to CFS

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, R. I.

10 November 1947

Memorandum for Chief of Staff

With reference to my Washington trip I have to report as follows:

1. The missing volume, Battle of the Coral Sea, has been found. There appeared to be considerable doubt as to where it was found and who had it, as Captain Southwick did not know. The man who delivered it to him--a civilian--said that Captain Rooney had it. Then he mentioned a Doctor Gayer, who appeared to be completely unknown to Captain Southwick. I sat there as the lost book was brought in. Captain Southwick will probably say that the book was stowed away because they didn't have money to print it, and do not expect to have money for a couple of months. The whole thing is very careless. I would judge from the appearance of the book and the appearance of the forwarding letter that the book was not in a safe, but had been stowed somewhere else. Anyway, it has been found, which is a relief.
2. I talked to Captain Smoot about the detachment of Richardson, and Captain Smoot said that he was not going to detach him and also said, "I am not going to snipe at you anymore." He then told me that the man responsible for the trouble was Captain Heffernan, who had called him and told him that it was quite all right to detach Richardson and to please issue the orders, or words to that effect. Captain Smoot then told Captain Heffernan that his word was not sufficient, and that he would refer the matter to the President of the War College through Admiral Sprague. He said further that the reply from the War College was a very nice one and that they were not going to do what the historical section suggested. By the way, Captain Smoot is being detached and will be relieved by some Captain McClain--I am not too sure of the spelling.
3. I saw Admiral Sprague. The conversation was quite friendly. Admiral Sprague said that the War College had top priority with him, and indicated that it was a sort of a strain. Why, I did not discover. I spoke of Admiral Spruance's letter in reply to his, and he said that he hadn't seen the reply as yet, but as he had been away for some days, the letter was probably in his basket.

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4. I saw Captain Fullinwider in the office of ONI, concerning translations, and he said that, for the present, they had no translators, but some time later would, of course, have them back again on reserve duty. When that occurred, which would be some time from now, they might be able to do some more translations. As ONI and Captain Fullinwider did not appear to be a very fertile ground, I went over to see Captain Olsen in the CIA. Captain Olsen called a conference of the representatives of the three services in charge of translations, and we discussed the problem. He showed me a letter, which he had just drawn up, which indicated in the first 3 paragraphs that they wouldn't be able to do any work, but which in the last line indicated that they might. I asked them to explain this seeming paradox. Captain Olsen said they expected to bring in a bunch of green translators who would translate non-classified material until qualified for classified, and that therefore these men might be available for our work for a time. He said they expected to begin getting translators in about two weeks, but that it might be longer. He also said that the Naval War College letters had helped very much in getting this extra help and they were grateful.

I then went over and saw Roscoe Hillencotter. I had a very friendly discussion with him also. He indicated a support for Captain Olsen's plan, and seemed to feel that we would get some work done presently.

I asked Admiral Hillencotter about the congressional investigations of the movie people and he said that everyone of those men who had refused to answer was definitely a member of the Communist Party. I told him that we might be interested here in having the head of the FBI, Mr. Hoover, make a talk here, and if we asked him, would he come. Admiral Hillencotter said that he was quite sure that he would come if we didn't make it right away, but gave Mr. Hoover a little time to fit the address on his schedule. Admiral Hillencotter also volunteered that he had a man in his own office who was very familiar with the Russian police set-up--who had lectured at the National War College--who was really very good--and he would let him come almost any time we desired him, and recommended that he come.

5. I had a long chat with Captain Ralph Parker, who was working on strategic command problems of the past war. He said that he wasn't quite sure still what he was supposed to be doing, and that he thought that the analytical section here was writing up some of the command decisions incident to these actions. If this was so, it would reduce his work. I suggested, if it would help him, that I would send him a copy of the Battle of the Coral Sea and of Midway as far as we had gone, which he accepted with astonishing promptness. Captain Parker said that his left ear was bad and he didn't think that they would keep him on duty any more. He also said that he thought that Admiral Spruance was very smart to get a house on the West Coast and that he himself would like to live there, but having dug in in Washington, he doubted

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if he would ever move again. He certainly is a fine fellow.

6. I heard two different comments concerning the War College. Admiral Ofstie said that he thought that the College wasn't up to date on air. I took exception to this to a degree, and told him that I thought air was being as well handled as possible, as we had a competent air staff. He said that the principal comment that he had heard had come from Assistant Secretary of the Air, Mr. Brown. I told Ofstie that I was somewhat surprised, as I did not think that Mr. Brown, although a recognized supporter of education, was familiar with what was going on here, and that if things were not all right, I presumed that Admiral Brown would find it out and make suggestions. Ofstie is working on a plan for war which I will discuss outside of this record. Admiral Hillencotter said that the War College was a wonderful place and all he had heard had been highly commendatory. In this connection, Admiral Nimitz asked me about the War College and what did I think of it and what had I heard about it. I told him that I had heard two stories in Washington; one, from Admiral Hillencotter, that it was wonderful, the other, Admiral Ofstie, that it was apparently a fine institution, but a little backward in air. Admiral Nimitz said Ofstie was pulling my leg, as that was a means of getting information. I told the Admiral I did not think so in this case, but I didn't mention Secretary Brown. I don't know why it is, but I feel that our presentation in Washington may have been responsible for certain negative comment.

7. Captain Southwick wanted to discuss finances with me. I told him that I wasn't qualified to discuss them now, but that I would listen to his complaints. So he stated that he was having trouble in getting justifications for our requests for funds, and indicated that there were two matters which required justification, one in particular being the Electronics Building. He gave me some papers which I am forwarding herewith. These papers are the last word in budget estimates for the War College. He asked if we would not expedite in getting in these justifications, and indicated that he could not understand the delay. He modified his comments to the extent that he said the justifications might be in Washington and he simply had not got them.

He said that there was considerable discussions concerning the overlapping of colleges. I tried to explain to him that it made no difference, as the number of people who go to colleges is far below those available, and that few officers go to more than one college. In this he concurred, and stated that only 35% of all naval officers get any superior education of any kind at all. He pointed out that there was considerable discussion concerning the logistics course at the Naval War College, and said that they were having difficulty in interpreting the differences in training between the colleges. He then gave me a UN Training Bulletin with sections underlined, which indicated statements by Captain Benson,

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which I personally believe are untrue. I went on to explain to Captain Southwick how our Logistics School functions and how we function exactly as a staff of a Commander-in-Chief, maneuvering task forces, etc. and that no other institution could provide such particular training. In this connection I think that we will have to beware, because it appears there is a move afoot, which may have been suggested by the General Board, to examine into these college overlaps and possibly to fold up one or more of the colleges, or a particular branch of one or more of the colleges.

8. I had quite a long talk with Admiral Hopwood, which was accidental, as he came into Admiral Fechteler's office when I was there. Admiral Fechteler did not show up, so we discussed everything, including the pay bill. Hopwood said that money was tight, and the inference I got was that they were trying to get a deficiency appropriation of 50 million dollars which, if we got it would give the War College an additional \$5,000. If they got \$150,000,000, then we would probably get \$20,000 extra. This \$5-20,000 is for rebuilding the War College. I complained bitterly that our allowance was not adequate and that we were working very hard to keep the expenditures at the minimum, but from what I could hear, other organizations of similar type were not doing so. In this connection, I had seen Commodore Sprague from Armed Forces Staff College over in Bupers and I had seized from him the Armed Forces Staff College Budget which is 733,000 dollars. Part of this is for keeping up 180 sets of quarters, which is compensated for by the return as shown of \$230,000. Even at that, the Armed Forces Staff College is getting \$170,000 roughly, more than we are with less personnel. I was told by either Commodore Sprague or Captain Southwick that the National War College has a budget of over one million dollars for, roughly 100 students. I pointed out the utter incongruity of these allotments.

9. I saw the Public Information Officer for not over 2 minutes, as he had just come in from Columbus, Ohio, and I was leaving the building to return to Newport. He told me that Major Elliot had liked the Naval Strategy and Naval Tactics articles very much, but that Blockade was not considered up to the standard of the others. I had wanted to discuss PI matters, but I had no time.

10. I had a long talk with Commodore Maher concerning the Electronics Building, and he said that he sort of claimed an early association with a similar idea which had been advanced by Admiral Laning in the Fleet; that it was of great importance and they were going to do all they could to push it along. I think that we should follow this electronics thing rather closely. While Commodore Maher is in that desk, we have a friend.

11. I had a talk with Admiral Towers, who said that his Board had completed a four-months' study of the naval establishment and had made recommendations for consolidation, including the closing of stations, etc. but that what was happening to the report, he did not as yet know. This alarmed me a little, as I know that I had been interrogated by that Board some time before concerning the possible overlapping of colleges and the possible closure of overlaps.

12. I had conversations also with Admiral Cato Glover, Captain Carter, Admiral Riggs, Admiral McMorris, Admiral McCrea, Admiral Curts, Admiral Ramsey and others. Admiral Cato Glover has been transferred to the Joint Staff Planners and Captain Carter had succeeded as head of Strategic Plans. I also had dinner with Chick Glover. I will tell you about it.

13. I had a talk with Congressman Gerhardt of Fresno, Cal. of the Ways and Means Committee, and I discussed with him the Navy Pay Bill and the necessity for immediate action. He said that his committee was going to take up Armed Forces legislation to build up a strong Armed Force as one of the first items on the agenda. He also indicated that there would definitely be an income tax cut as of 1 January. He pointed out that before the war there had been 7 million tax payers and now there were 52 million. Evidently for election reasons, they would like to cut out many of the tax payers.

14. It was a little difficult, coming in as I did, to make good connections with the people that I wanted to see. The result of this was that I had to wait some time in some offices. In the case of Admiral Sprague the delay was quite an extensive one, because he apparently had a conference. Washington is full of conferences. Carter told me that he had been to three that day, and Gnu Maher appeared to be attending them all the time. What they are about, I do not know.

I think that this visit of mine was very productive--I saw a great many people and I was surprised at their very friendly manner toward me in the highest echelons. I had no difficulty in obtaining information, in fact, it was readily volunteered and I was often interrogated as to my personal reactions. I personally believe that the War College requires closer contact than at present with the Washington boys. Commodore Sprague from Armed Forces Staff College was there merely to cement relations, and Harry Hill is right in the middle of the soup. I had a long talk with him over the phone. He wanted me to visit him and to hear the lecture by Lord Inverchapel, British Ambassador, on Saturday morning, but I could not do it, as I could not have finished my mission and caught my plane. Those boys in the National War College are certainly building themselves up in the Washington scene.

John McCrea wondered why you never came to Washington.
Perhaps it might be wise to venture there.

R. W. Bates

R. W. Bates

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Capt. R.W. Bates, USN
- N-17 5

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

10 December 1947

Memorandum for Staff

Subject: Speech Instruction and Analysis - Tentatively
scheduled for the week of 26 January 1948.

1. Professor Packard of the Harvard University Speech Department will conduct scheduled speech instruction and analysis for one week, tentatively scheduled for 26 January 1948. When not otherwise engaged in scheduled instruction, Professor Packard will be available in Room 226, Luce Hall, for additional consultation.
2. The officers listed in Annex A are requested, prior to 19 December 1947, to make a 5 to 6 minute recording of a prepared lecture or presentation which they have previously given, or to prepare such presentation for the occasion, preferably on a Naval subject. These recordings will be mailed to Professor Packard for analysis prior to the scheduled periods of private consultation to be conducted in January.
3. When the actual date (calendar week) is firm, a detailed schedule of 30-minute consultations each for each staff officer and designated student officers will be promulgated. For this latter consultation, officers are requested to bring with them a prepared lecture or presentation on any subject, preferably prepared by themselves. (Do NOT wait until time for your consultation to have this material available.)
4. When the schedule is distributed, those officers unable to meet the scheduled time are requested to notify, as soon as possible, Commander Hay (or Captain Dunlap), in Room 116, in order that another time can be made available. Due to the tight schedule and the large number of officers concerned, rigid adherence to the schedule is necessary.
5. Refer any questions relative to the speech instruction program to an officer of the Communications Section, Room 116.

Allan E. Smith
ALLAN E. SMITH
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief of Staff

Distribution:
Officers in Annex A.
Staff.

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

ANNEX "A"

Officers designated to make 5 to 6 minute recordings for analysis by Professor Packard. (These should be completed by 19 December 1947.)

Staff

R. Adm. C. R. Brown, U.S.N.
Captain P.C. Crosley
Captain J. Sylvester
Captain S. B. Dunlap
Comdr. E. K. Schofield
Commander A. T. Church
Commander E. C. Stone

Students

Commander G. Hawkins, R.N.
Lt. Comdr. G.S. Mowll, R.N.
Commander J.S. Richardson, R.N.
Mr. T. A. Hickok (State Dept.)
Mr. J.B. Lathrop (O.E.G.)

Captain W.V. Hamilton, U.S.N.